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Distinguishing characteristics of General Purpose Technologies (GPTs) are identified and 
definitions discussed. Our definition includes multipurpose and single-purpose technologies, 
defining them according to their micro-technological characteristics, not their macro-economic 
effects. Identifying technologies as GPTs requires recognizing their evolutionary nature, and 
accepting possible uncertainties concerning marginal cases. Many of the existing ‘tests’ of 
whether particular technologies are GPTs are based on misunderstandings either of what GPT 
theory predicts or what such tests can establish. The development of formal GPT theories is 
outlined, showing that only the early theories predicted the inevitability of GPT-induced 
showdown and surges. More recent GPT theories, designed to model the characteristics of GPTs, 
do not imply the necessity of specific macro effects. We show that GPTs can rejuvenate the 
growth process without causing slowdowns or surges. We conclude that existing criticisms of 
GPT theory can be resolved and that the concept remains useful for economic theory. 
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GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGIES IN THEORY, APPLICATIONS AND 
CONTROVERSY: A REVIEW1 
 
Two main approaches to studying economic growth over the very long-run are found in 
the literature: the analysis of economic historians and the formal model building of economic 
theorists. Both literatures agree that technological change is a major driver of economic growth. 
Economic historians take a nuanced view of technology as a complex and multi-layered 
phenomenon, often focusing on historically significant signpost technologies such as the heavy 
plough, the printing press, the steam engine and their transformative effects on the economy, 
institutions, and social structures. Until recently, and in contrast, most formal theories of 
economic growth modelled technology as a scalar that is either an argument in, or multiplicative 
constant to, an aggregate production function. The contribution of technology to growth in this 
framework is usually estimated as the residual output after accounting for the contribution of 
measured aggregate inputs. 
With the publication of Bresnahan and Trajenberg’s (1995) paper2 “General Purpose 
Technologies: ‘Engines of Growth?” some theorists began to model technology and 
technological change in a more nuanced way than in most traditional macro growth models.3 
Since that time, the General Purpose Technology (GPT) research program has been evolving 
piecemeal. In largely uncoordinated efforts, this research program has defined GPTs, modeled 
their evolution, tested their predicted and presumed effects, and criticised the very usefulness of 
the concept. As a result, the GPT literature contains many conflicting ideas and unresolved 
controversies. Given these developments, it seems appropriate to: (i) review the GPT literature to 
locate and remove anomalies, inconsistencies and other deficiencies; and, (ii) note instances 
where GPT theory has proven productive in economists’ study of economic growth. 
We find two main classes of criticism of GPTs. The first comes from economic historians 
who question the usefulness of GPTs as a way to think about technology and innovation. We 
take Field (2011) as representative of historians’ criticisms and, where they are relevant to our 
discussions throughout our paper, we provide our responses to his most important arguments. 
The second comes from economists who have sought to test what they perceive to be predictions 
of GPT theory. We argue that both of these types of criticisms need to be met because the 
program of modelling technology as more than just a scalar is important for theoretical 
treatments of economic growth. 
There is a significant overlap between the work of economists modeling economic growth 
and that of economic historians seeking to describe and understand the processes that lead to 
such growth. Given the distinct nature both of the questions motivating economic historians and 
economic theorists and their techniques for answering them, they may come to different 
conclusions regarding the potential usefulness of the concept of a GPT. It is our view that the 
program of modeling technology and technical change in a more structured manner than can be 
                                                 
1 This is a revised version of a paper first presented at the International Schumpeter Society Conference, 
Montreal, Canada, July 2016. We are indebted to the participants in the session on General Purpose 
Technologies and to an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions.  
2 This paper was first published in 1992 as an NBER working paper and later published in 1995 in The Journal 
of Econometrics. Hereafter we refer to the 1995 paper. 
3 For a discussion of a range of precursors to this general concept see Cantner and Vannuccini (2012). 
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caught by a single variable is a critically important research program in growth theory, and it is 
to this issue that this paper’s analysis is directed  
We begin by identifying six technological characteristics that serve to distinguish GPTs 
from other technologies. We then discuss alternative definitions of GPTs, arguing that GPTs 
should be defined in terms of their micro-technological characteristics, not their macro-economic 
effects. We then argue for the usefulness of a broad definition of GPTs, one that does not 
exclude single-generic-purpose technologies that are widely used across the whole economy 
(e.g., the printing press and three-masted sailing ship). Next we discuss how to identify a GPT. 
This requires that we recognise two things. First, like any major technology, a GPT is not static 
but evolves continually over time. Second, as with any set of theoretical classes meant to stylise 
real observations, there is always uncertainty at the boundaries concerning whether a particular 
item is inside or outside of some given class. We illustrate this identification issue with two 
examples, electricity and the 3-masted sailing ship. This leads us to consider some existing 
‘tests’ of whether particular technologies are GPTs. We argue that some of these tests are based 
on a misunderstanding of what are and are not predictions of GPT theory, while others are based 
on a misunderstanding of what such tests can actually establish. To deal with the latter point we 
address some methodological issues. Having rejected the allegations that these tests show that 
some particular technologies are not GPTs, we consider what can be learned from empirical 
work related to GPTs. Having done the required ground clearing with respect to definitions and 
tests, we move to assess the evolution of formal theories of GPTs, paying particular attention to 
what they do and do not predict. Most importantly we show that only the first post-Bresnahan-
and-Trajtenberg generation of GPT theories predicted the inevitability of an aggregate 
showdown and/or productivity surge after the introduction of a new GPT, and that these theories 
were designed to produce such predictions. More recent GPT models that are designed to model 
their characteristics are agnostic regarding their macro effects. These models clearly demonstrate 
that GPT theory does not imply the necessity of slowdowns and/or productivity surges. This 
leads us to consider how GPTs can rejuvenate the growth process without necessarily producing 
either slowdowns or surges. In the final section we conclude that the concept of a GPT is helpful 
for growth theory, and that many of the serious criticisms directed at it can be resolved. 
I. CHARACTERISTICS AND DEFINITIONS  
We first need to consider the general concept of technology before passing on to consider the 
specific technologies that are GPTs. 
Technology  
Technology is not always clearly defined in the literature, it is variously used to refer to: 
(i) the process of applying knowledge to practical uses; (ii) specific machines or processes 
themselves; and, (iii) the knowledge of how to make things of economic value. Lipsey, Carlaw 
and Bekar (2005: 58) define the concept as follows: “Technological knowledge, technology for 
short, is the set of ideas specifying all activities that create economic value.” They argue that this 
knowledge is embodied in capital goods (e.g., machines, tools, structures, etc.), human capital, 
organisational forms (e.g., the limited liability corporation, the arrangement of machines on the 
factory floor, etc.) and institutions (e.g., rules, procedures, etc.). The definition separates 
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technology from pure science on the one hand, and its embodiment in capital goods and the 
economic structure on the other. While we use the standard shorthand of referring to artefacts as 
technologies, we strictly refer to the knowledge of how to make and use these artefacts. For 
example, when we refer to the technology of bronze we mean it as shorthand for the knowledge 
of how to produce and utilise bronze.  
Six Key Characteristics 
Our study of GPTs leads us to identify six characteristics that serve to identify a 
technology as a GPT. These characteristics are closely related to those of Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg (1995), although these authors put more emphasis on productivity changes and we 
do not. We avoid this emphasis because we wish to make productivity effects possible 
consequences of GPTs rather than identifying characteristics. Also while we accept their point 
that GPTs often supply some single generic function, we do not make this one of our defining 
characteristics for two reasons. First, because we think that many non-GPTs also do this and, 
second, because we wish to avoid fruitless arguments as to just what the generic function is in 
the case of each GPT.4  
The first three characteristics in the following list concern categories of technological 
complementarities which are defined by Carlaw and Lipsey (2002:1310) as, the actions of the 
initiating agents with respect to their own technologies that affect the value of other agents’ 
technologies and/or their opportunities for further technological advances. The last three 
characteristics concern the scope of those complementarities and their inherently evolutionary 
nature. 
1. Complementarities with a cluster of technologies that define and support it. The 
evolution of GPTs exhibit technological complementarities within the evolving 
cluster of technologies that define and support them. These complementarities are 
multi-directional among the elements of that cluster (For example, computers are 
used in the development and production of new chips, which are then used to 
increase the range of use and productivity of other digital devices, including 
computers.)  
2. Complementarities with a cluster of technologies that it enables. GPTs exhibit 
technological complementarities beyond the evolving cluster of technologies that 
define and support them by enabling myriad new downstream inventions and 
innovations, many of which were technically impossible, or economically 
unfeasible, without the GPT and which are not identifiable as part of the GPT. 
These in turn enable further inventions and innovations as well as influencing the 
evolution of the GPT. (For example, electricity helped to enable the electronic 
computer, which enabled the Internet.) 
                                                 
4 For example Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) suggest that the generic function provided by the steam engine 
was rotary motion. This view has been sharply criticised by historians, and rightly so in our view. The steam 
engine initially produced reciprocal motion, but knowledge concerning the translation of reciprocal motion into 
rotary motion and vise versa had been around for centuries. Further, we might debate which function provided 
by the engine—rotary motion or non-location-specific power—was the key generic function. 
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3. Complementarities with a cluster of technologies that typically include those that 
are socially, politically and economically transformative. As the uses of a GPT 
expand in range and variety of their applications, the technologies involved have 
significant impacts on the economic structure and very often on the political and 
social structures as well, requiring changes in, or opening opportunities for, 
innovations in the technologies that are or will become embodied in these 
structures. (For example, as well as their major impacts on much of the economic 
structure, modern ICTs enabled the social media that are altering the techniques 
and content of communication in politics and society).5 
4. There are no close substitutes. GPTs create complementarities with many or most 
of their applications that are: (i) unique ─ no other combination of technologies 
can produce the application ─ and (ii) Leontief ─ without it the whole system 
would not work. (For example, there is no alternative to electricity for most of the 
contemporary technologies in which it is the power component and without it 
most of these technologies could not function or even exist.)  
5. Have a wide array of applications. The GPT’s wide array of complementarities 
(points 1 – 3) result either in GPTs having multiple uses (e.g. electricity), or a 
single generic use that itself has many economic applications across much or all 
of the economy (e.g., railways). 
6. Initially crude but evolving in complexity. Technologies that evolve to become 
GPTs typically begin in a crude and incomplete form, often with a narrow range 
of uses. This makes the identification of any one GPTs depend on a judgment as 
to when the technology has developed sufficient technological complementarities 
that it now has all of the other five characteristics in this list. We can know when 
a technology is clearly not a GPT and when it clearly is one, but the change from 
one to the other is a continuous process with no clear point in time. (For example, 
the electronic computer was clearly not a GPT in 1950 and clearly was one in 
1990, but one can argue at what point in time the change occurred and what was 
the critical invention.)  
Characteristics 2 and 3 are clearly related. Characteristic 2 is the more immediate and 
often more mundane of the complementarities, while 3 is the more downstream and often more 
dramatic. Most GPTs will have characteristics that vary more or less continually from one 
extreme to the other. Because this may cause some uncertainty as to whether some borderline 
characteristic should be classified under 2 or 3, one might wonder why we separate these two 
classes. The reason is that some non-GPTs will have many entries under class 2 but none under 
3, so what matters in identifying a technology as a GPT is that there are items that are clearly in 
c-2 and others that are clearly in c-3. 
                                                 
5 Characteristic 3 preserves an important connection to work done on a class of enabling technologies before 
the formal modeling of Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995). Freeman and Perez (1988) refer to a constellation of key 
technologies and their support structure as a Technoeconomic Paradigm. For a full discussion of technological 
spillovers and related concepts see Carlaw and Lipsey (2002). 
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Three things determine whether a new technology evolves to possess these 
characteristics: (i) its internal nature (which helps to determine its potential); (ii) its external 
interaction with other technologies (which helps to determine the extent and magnitude of its 
effects); (iii) the efficiency of the technology in delivering its services (which helps to determine 
whether or not the technology is widely adopted). 
On internal nature, many technologies have the potential to evolve into a GPT. Some are 
easily identified early on as having this potential. For example, it was clear early on that both 
nano-technology and bio-technology had the potential to become GPTs. (See for example 
Crandell (1996) for nano-technology and Grace (1997) for bio-technology). In other cases, it was 
a surprise that a new technology, often invented for specific uses, evolved to become a GPT. 
This was the case, for example, with computers and the Internet. On interaction, a technology 
that only interacts weakly with other technologies will not become a GPT. The extent of a 
technology’s interaction depends on its internal nature and on the set of other existing 
technologies. On efficiency, having potential is not enough. If a technology cannot be made 
efficient enough to be widely adopted throughout much of the economy, its potential will not be 
realised. For example, hydrogen fuels cells, have many of the characteristics that provide the 
potential to become a GPT. However, their efficiency could not (at least to date) be increased 
sufficiently for them to become pervasive and hence to realise that potential.  
Some Criticisms   
Two criticisms from economic historians are relevant at this point. First, some historians 
question whether GPT theorists have added historical depth to their theorizing or simply misread 
their historical case studies; arguing that the properties listed above may have been derived from 
flawed histories and so may offer misleading lessons to theorists. A related issue is whether the 
set of technologies posited as GPTs by theorists constitutes a coherent set. We argue that our 
GPTs belong to a theoretically, and historically, coherent set because they all share the above six 
defining characteristics. Other cases of assumed historical errors are considered later in the 
paper. While we agree that it is important to get the history correct—and we wish to correct it 
where it has been in error—we believe the above list defines a set of characteristics found in a 
historically and theoretically important set of technologies.  
Second, some historians have questioned whether or not GPTs can be meaningfully 
distinguished from a broader class of “historically important innovations?” As Field (2011:  218) 
puts it “There are many single-purpose innovations (for example, the cotton gin) with arguably 
large implications for TFP [total factor productivity] (and all sorts of other outcomes), and there 
can be “general-purpose” innovations that represent relatively marginal improvements over 
previously existing technology and have low social saving/contribution to TFP (for example, the 
felt-tipped pen).” On Field’s first point, nothing in GPT theory precludes the existence of non-
GPTs that have some of the same effects as GPTs. On his second point, the felt tipped-pen and 
other similar single-purpose technologies are ruled out as GPTs because, having many close 
substitutes, they do not satisfy defining characteristic 4.  
We do not doubt that there are some “historically important innovations” that according to 
our list of characteristics are not GPTs, nor that there are some technologies that share most but 
not all of these characteristics. But these are the same boundary problems associated with any 
theoretical abstraction that attempts to categorise reality into discrete and mutually exclusive 
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boxes. In the present case, if we were to enumerate all of history’s technologies, they would be 
seen to cover a continuum from the very specific to the very general in their direct applications 
and their technological complementarities. Such ranges of continuous variation are commonly 
encountered in economics: capital output ratios vary more or less continuously across firms and 
industries; the number of firms in an industry varies more or less continuously from ‘one’ to 
‘very many.’ It is, however, demonstrably useful in each of these cases to divide individual items 
into sets in order to theorise. For example, we talk of capital-intensive industries and contrast 
their behaviour with labour-intensive industries in spite of the fact that industries with many 
different ratios exist. Also, we theorise about monopolies, duopolies, oligopolies, 
monopolistically competitive and perfectly competitive industries, although in fact there is no 
dividing line that clearly distinguishes the behaviours of firms with n, n+1, and n-1 competitors, 
for any but very small values of n. In each case, the characteristics of the typical item will differ 
markedly from the characteristics of the typical items in other sets, although there will be 
individual items in each set that are close to boundary elements in adjacent sets.   
One example of this useful grouping of many items into a few classes is when one 
isolates an extreme class from a continuous set. The concept of a GPT is a case in point. We 
have defined such technologies to lie at one extreme of the characteristics of all technologies. 
There are technologies that might be just below our threshold criteria in any or all of these 
dimensions and others that are slightly less than that and so on. As Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar 
(2005: 97) put it: “…what distinguishes GPTs from other technologies is a matter of degree. So 
there will always be technologies that on our definition are almost, but not quite GPTs”. 
Definitions 
While the above six characteristics are the identifying features of GPTs, we need to 
compress them into a succinct definition for easy reference (always understanding that when in 
doubt it is the six characteristics that matter). Not surprisingly there has been some debate and 
confusion about an appropriate definition of a GPT. We do not wish to fall into the essentialist 
trap of assuming that there is one true definition. We are instead interested in ensuring that the 
definition of GPTs clearly delineates a class of technologies whose characteristics we have listed 
above. 
There are two separate issues here. First, how inclusive should a definition of GPTs be? 
Second, should GPTs include single-use technologies that are widely used and share all of the 
other six defining characteristics?   
Considering the inclusiveness of our definition Cantner and Vannuccini (2012) put it this 
way: there is a “knife-edge distinction…between those scholars who recognize only two or three 
GPTs since the industrial revolution (the steam engine, electrification and the more questioned 
ICTs) and see them as singularities or extreme cases of radical innovations (“epochal 
innovations” as Rosenberg and Trajtenberg (2004) term them), and those who expand the list to a 
much more wide range of technologies.” Clearly Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) are in this 
latter class when they observe that not just a single GPT but “a handful” populate every historical 
period.  
Of course as economic historians we are free to study any class of technologies that 
interest us. But as theorists we wish to use in our models a class that captures the features that we 
think need studying. These considerations leads us to choose to study the broader class of GPTs 
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for a number of reasons. First, and perhaps most importantly, we believe an important 
application of GPT theory concerns how multiple overlapping GPTs interact. Too narrow a 
definition usually renders at most one GPT per ‘economic epoch.’ We believe that the historical 
evidence shows that interactions among GPTs (and of course among other technologies as well) 
are important determinants of how they evolve. For example, the three emerging GPTs of 
biotechnology, nanotechnology and robotisation (all of which are enabled by computers and 
electricity) are interacting with each other today and will do so increasingly in the near future. 
Second, and related to the first point, some important implications from GPT theory are derived 
from the dynamics of how existing GPTs compete and are replaced with newly emerging GPTs. 
Confining our study to a very small set of technologies forces us to ignore these interactions. 
Third, we believe that limiting the set of GPTs to only two or three in all of history overly limits 
the applicability of GPT theory. The concept of GPTs has been usefully employed to study the 
water wheel, the internal combustion engine, the Internet, and so on. It is not clear why one 
should wish to rule out such potential applications ex ante. So we include a wider class of 
multiple-use GPTs, as long as they display our six defining characteristics. 
On the second issue, although most definitions stress the multiple uses of a GPT, some 
treatments include technologies that are single use, at least in a broadly defined, generic sense, as 
long as they are widely used over much of the economy and share the other defining 
characteristics of GPTs. This extends the definition to include such technologies as the movable-
type printing press and transportation technologies such as the three-masted sailing ship, the 
railroad, the motor vehicle, and the airplane. Both classes are of interest, those that only include 
multiple use technologies and those that admit single-use technologies but have all the other 
characteristics. Thus we offer two definitions depending on which group one wishes to study, the 
difference between the two being only in the italicised portions of the definitions.6 
 
GPT-a: A GPT is a single technology, or closely related group of technologies, 
that has many uses across most of the economy, is technologically dynamic in the sense 
that it evolves in efficiency and range of use in its own right, and is complementary with 
many downstream sectors where those uses enable a cascade of further inventions and 
innovations. 
  
GPT-b: A GPT is a single technology, or closely related group of technologies, 
that is widely used across most of the economy, is technologically dynamic in the sense 
that it evolves in efficiency and range of use in its own right, and complementary with 
many downstream sectors where those uses enable a cascade of further inventions and 
innovations. 
  
We believe that in terms of formal modeling and empirical applications, study of the 
wider class of technologies (GPT-b) is more useful than the study of the narrower class (GPT-a). 
It seems to us to be most fruitful to study together all of the technologies that share our six 
characteristics, whether they have multiple uses or a single generic use, as long as the latter are 
                                                 
6 For a fuller discussion of the concepts of being ‘widely used’ and “having many uses’ see Lipsey, Carlaw and 
Bekar (2005: Chapter 4)   
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widely used through most or all of the economy. So from here on when we speak of GPTs we 
refer to class-b type. 
Another potential source of confusion needs to be addressed.  For example, are calculus 
and Greek mechanics GPTs? They were both certainly important in helping to produce a wide 
range of valuable technologies. To deal with this issue we need to distinguish GPTs from what 
Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005) term General Purpose Principles (GPPs). The difference 
between GPPs and GPTs is that technologies (GPTs) represent the knowledge underlying some 
particular value-creating activity while principles (GPPs) are used to develop a range of 
technologies. For example, the Greek concept of mechanical advantage, underlying the 
technology of the lever, is a GPP; the knowledge of how to make a lever that exploits mechanical 
advantage is a technology.  
Micro and macro effects        
A major difference among definitions that exist in the literature is whether or not they 
include the effects of GPTs on a range of macro-economic indicators, as well as the broader 
economic, social and political transforming effects that often accompany their evolution. Neither 
of our two definitions include these possible macroeconomic effects, nor are they in our list of 
defining characteristics. However, Jovanovic and Rosseau (2005: 1182) include them stating: “A 
general purpose technology or GPT is a term coined to describe a new method of producing and 
inventing that is important enough to have a protracted aggregate impact.” 
We argue that such possible macro effects should not be part of the definition because it 
is important to specify the defining characteristics of a GPTs and then ask: What are the 
implications of these characteristics? When modeled, do they always produce given changes and 
if not, under what circumstances do they do so? These are interesting questions but if we only 
admit to our universe of study those technologies that have these characteristics, we cannot ask 
such questions. A parallel with growth theory illustrates this crucial issue. Until recently, most 
aggregate growth models defined technology in such a way that changes in it had to cause 
contemporaneous changes in GDP and productivity.7  The ‘productivity paradox’ occurred 
because empirical observations showed that these did not always change contemporaneously in 
the same direction. Such an outcome could not occur in these models, and hence they could not 
be used to study it. 
Lasers provide a clear illustration of why GPTs should not be defined in terms of their 
macro effects. According to our list of defining characteristics, lasers are a GPT. They are used 
across the whole economy from astronomy, to retail outlets, to hospitals, and they have made 
possible many developments that could not have occurred without them. But they have not had 
the disruptive macro effects found with the introduction of most new GPTs. Why? Our answer is 
that they fitted well into the current structure of the economy (what Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar 
(2005) call the facilitating structure) and so, unlike most other GPTs, they did not require major 
                                                 
7 In Hicks-neutral growth models, technology is a constant multiple to the aggregate production function: GPT 
= Af(K/L), while in Harrod-neutral models technology is defined as a constant multiple attached to the variable 
input labour: GDP = f(K, AL). In both cases, changes in technology, A, have to coincide with changes in both 
GDP and TFP.  
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structural changes and so did not induce ‘protracted aggregate impacts’ in order to become 
effective.  
II. IDENTIFYING A GPT 
It can be tempting to think of a GPT as being embodied in a single generic artefact, such as a 
dynamo, an electronic computer or a biotechnology laboratory. Economic historians have been 
rightly critical of some authors’ identification of such artefacts—e.g., the dynamo—as GPTs. As 
Field (2011: 223) notes, “It matters that we get the history right. The critical innovation in 
making commercial electric power a possibility was not the magneto or the dynamo, which had 
been under development for decades, but the steam turbine.” 8 Our response to this criticism 
starts by conceiving of GPTs as an evolving system of technologies. 
GPTs as evolving technologies 
While Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005) are clear that electricity had a long evolutionary 
history stretching over centuries, they appear to put inordinate emphasis on one invention and 
one date in that trajectory, the invention of the practical dynamo in 1867 (see pages 197 and 
255).  However, a critical point that has caused some confusion in the literature is that a GPT 
cannot be identified by any one artefact that was innovated at one point in time because the 
knowledge that is the GPT evolves through time as its own efficiency and range of applications 
change. What was an electronic computer in 1945 was very different from what was an 
electronic computer in 1950, 1955, 1960, and so on. This was also the case with electricity. We 
accept that the dynamo, the alternator, the rotary converter, and the transformer, which together 
allowed for the generation of commercially viable electricity, along with the transmission lines 
that facilitated its distribution, were some of the main sub-technologies that were important parts 
of the evolving GPT: the knowledge of how to generate and distribute electricity. No single one 
of these was the critical invention. Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005: 211) make this point clearly 
in their discussion of biotechnology:  
 
“The GPP of understanding the genetic code was turned into a GPT by several inventions 
that made it a practical technology. First, was the discovery of a family of enzymes...that 
can recognise a particular sequence in DNA and cut it at the required point. Then came 
the technique that allowed the various fragments of DNA to be separated into 
homogeneous groups. After that was recombinant DNA in which fragments of DNA are 
joined….With these inventions, biotechnology became a true process GPT, which like 
any process, could be used in the manufacturing (or creating) of many different 
products.” 
 
Because there is rarely if ever a single technological artefact that can be pointed to as an 
entire GPT, these technologies constitute an evolving knowledge set that is almost always made 
up of many cooperating artefacts. GPTs are sometimes referred to as a single technology and 
                                                 
8 Note, however, that the steam turbine was not a part of the GPT of electricity but an illustration of the 
importance of complementary technologies in the applications of any specific GPT. 
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there can be no harm in using this as a shorthand for the evolving process of how to do 
something, unless it obscures the long evolution and slow accretion of technological knowledge 
that is the typical story of a GPT. For example, Feldman and Yoon (2011) refer to rDNA as the 
GPT that we discussed above as biotechnology. Ours is a broader definition, covering the class 
of discoveries and inventions that make modern biotechnology possible. Theirs is a more specific 
case of knowledge about one of the key elements in that development. Defining one of these 
more specific elements as the GPT can give rise to unproductive arguments as to which of the 
various sub-technologies is the GPT. It can also obscure the fact that a GPT is an evolving body 
of knowledge. For these reasons, it seems essential to understand that the whole bundle of how to 
do the job is the GPT: e.g., how to make commercially useful bronze, electricity, or genetically 
manipulated entities.  
An implication of the definition of a GPT as an evolving knowledge set is that there is 
rarely a definitive unique date for a GPT’s emergence, or for its disappearance. Some, such as 
the three-masted sailing ship, disappear almost completely; some, such as the classic Victorian 
steam engine, retreat into specialised niches but no longer have the characteristics of a GPT; 
others, such as electricity, remain as GPTs for centuries, enabling countless new innovations. In 
theoretical models, in contrast, it is always clear when a new GPT arrives and when it is 
replaced. In empirical work a starting and ending date must be somewhat arbitrary. For example, 
in their comparison of electricity and IT, Jovanovic and Rosseau (2005) select the following 
dates: 1894-1930 for electricity and 1971 until the present for the “IT era.” We will have more to 
say about this choice later on, but the issue should be clear: many of the technological 
developments since 1930 could not have occurred unless they were enabled by electricity; if 
electricity is to have an end date as a GPT that is still well in the future.  
GPTs as a theoretical class 
Field argues that—as a classificatory ordering—GPTs may obscure more than they 
clarify. Considering steam, electricity and ICT, Field (2011: 220) questions, “whether their 
histories share enough similarities to justify the distillation of their experiences into a common 
category with presumably broader applicability.” This raises an important question about 
abstraction in theory and practice. 
Consider another applied abstraction as an illustration. Business school economists spend 
much time studying the internal working of firms, important in understanding much of their 
behaviour. Industrial Organization theorists typically suppress much of this detail and group 
firms into classes such as monopolies, oligopolies, and perfect competitors. Although this 
abstracts from much internal behaviour, it proves useful in studying some similarities in how 
firms behave in different market conditions. Micro theorists often abstract even further, typically 
treating all firms as simple maximising entities. Although this ignores even more, it concentrates 
on how firms tend to react to changes in such things as input and output prices. Macro theorists 
abstract even further, treating the production sector as a single unit distinct from the consumption 
sector. Because each level of theoretical abstraction is appropriate for dealing with a different 
class of questions, and although the more abstract theories are not helpful in answering finer-
grained questions, it is not productive to argue which is the best level of abstraction. 
To return to Field’s critique, steam, electricity and computers reveal many differences in 
their individual evolutions and in their influences on the economy. By stressing their common 
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elements, GPT theory suppresses many of those differences. Our answer to Field’s question 
posed at the outset of this section is that all three technologies share the characteristics laid out in 
our list of six defining characteristics. The relevant question that remains is: Does the level of 
abstraction needed to define GPTs help in modelling some aspects of economic growth and 
technical change? That GPTs prove useful in theoretical models of endogenous growth suggests 
that our answer to this question is “yes”. 
Two examples: electricity and the three-masted sailing ship 
Not surprisingly with an evolving research program, there has been some confusion on 
identifying particular GPTs. Indeed, some historians have been critical of the differences among 
researchers that have resulted. We argue that a technology is identified as a GPT when it can be 
shown to have the defining characteristics listed in Section I. Here we illustrate this procedure 
with respect to two technologies, electricity a type-a GPT, that is among the most pervasive of all 
GPTs, and the three-masted sailing ship, a type-b GPT, that some readers have argued is not a 
GPT. We provide only enough detail in each of the 6 characteristics to illustrate how to establish 
that a technology is a GPT while understanding that there is much more that could be said in 
each case.9  
Electricity 
1. Complementarities with a cluster of technologies that define and support it. A 
number of related technologies show how to generate and distribute electric 
current efficiently (the knowledge of how to do so constitutes the technology of 
electricity). The practical generation of relatively low cost electricity provided the 
incentive for the development of transmission networks and generation facilities. 
Electricity has co-evolved with many supporting technologies including steam 
and hydroelectric generation methods. It has also co-evolved with many 
supporting applications in the pre-existing production structure.  
2. Complementarities with clusters of technologies that it enables. Many of these 
downstream technologies were technically impossible without the GPT (e.g., 
electricity enabled computers). An example includes the replacement of the 
central drive shaft used in steam powered factories by unit-drive motors attached 
to each individual machine which allowed for, among many other important 
things, more efficient arrangement of machines on the factory floor. Those that 
used the most power no longer needed to be placed close to the drive shaft but 
could instead be placed in the order in which they were used in the production 
process. This transforming rearrangement involved (among many other things) 
the co-evolution of the electric motor, the unit-driven machine tools that it 
powered and the organizational technology of the flow of production within 
facilities. Along with the development of machine tools that could cut pre-
                                                 




hardened steel, these technologies paved the way for Ford’s assembly line and the 
vast productivity gains that came from its slow spread through the US economy 
over the next decades, and later to much of the rest of the world. Many of the 
other downstream technologies in turn often enabled further inventions and 
innovations. For example, a whole range of electrified household products were 
innovated, some of which were wholly new and some of which were mechanised 
versions of the hand or foot powered machines that they replaced: washing 
machines and dryers, dishwashers, refrigerators, electric stoves, vacuum cleaners, 
toasters, mixers, can openers, blenders, automatic bread makers and so on. Many 
of these products emerged in crude and incomplete form initially, but, eventually 
gave rise to wholly new industries to produce and service increasingly 
sophisticated versions. 
3. Complementarities with a cluster of technologies that typically include those that 
are socially, politically and economically transformative. The Fordist production 
line was first used to mass produce the family car, which in its turn helped to 
create the suburb, dramatically altering the distribution of populations within 
many cities, first in North America and eventually worldwide. As an enabling 
component of the computer, the Internet, and, ultimately social media, electricity 
has also helped to dramatically alter modern political dynamics and social 
interactions. 
4. There are no possible close substitutes. There exists no alternative to electricity 
for most contemporary technologies in which it is their power component. This is 
obvious with most of the jobs done by electricity, such as powering computers, 
lasers, electronic microscopes, radios, TV sets, GIS, GPS and so on ad infinitum. 
More generally, imagine removing electricity altogether, allowing agents to 
substitute into their next best alternative that either exists or is at least technically 
feasible with current knowledge. Telephones could be replaced by semaphore and 
fast inter- and intra-city mail service, but no technology could replace a host of 
products such as the internet, high speed electronic computers, the cloud, 
electronic microscopes, and most of the products of bio- and nano-technology. An 
estimate of the number of downstream technologies eliminated in such an 
exercise is a proxy for just how ‘general purpose’ electricity has become in 
today’s world. 
5. Have a wide array of applications. The myriad uses of electricity in our 
‘electronic age’ are clear. For a slight variation on the argument in 4 above, note 
what stops working when a city-wide power failure occurs.  
6. Initially crude and evolving in nature. The development trajectory of electricity 
and magnetism stretched back at least 200 years prior to its use in the telegraph 
early in the 19th century followed later by its emergence as a more generally 
applicable power source. Initially electricity was generated with the magneto and 
then the dynamo.  While electricity solved some immediate problems, such as 
replacing gas lighting and powering small motors and streetcars, it also opened up 
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myriad new opportunities across the whole economy such as electrolysis and 
electroplating. These took decades to develop and exploit and are on-going today.  
The Three-Masted (3M) Sailing Ship 
1. Complementarities with a cluster of technologies that define and support it. The 
technology of the 3M sailing ship was knowledge concerning a cluster of 
technologies, including sail, rigging and hull design, which co-evolved along with 
a number of navigational and organizational technologies, including a general 
understanding of magnetism, techniques for time keeping, marine insurance and 
forms of limited liability investment. As the 16th century wore on, 3M ships 
improved in sea worthiness, navigation aids improved, and European knowledge 
of the world was filled in as more and more of it was mapped and charted. All of 
these developments gradually reduced the risks associated with long distance 
travel by sea. 
2. Complementarities with clusters of technologies that it enables. There were many 
downstream inventions and innovations that would not have occurred without 
global trade on the scale that the 3M ship permitted. Although these were not 
technically impossible without the ship, they were economically unfeasible. The 
organization of firms and the mix of the products they produced and sold changed 
greatly. The development of sea route to the East undermined the established 
Venetian system of trade that had evolved over centuries in the Mediterranean 
basin. Shipping along the Atlantic required its own structural adaptations and 
innovations. Port cities, some of them previously only fishing towns, became the 
centres of trade, banking and shipbuilding. An elaborate apparatus was developed 
for production, distribution and sale of basic materials going from the rest of the 
world to Europe, manufactured goods from Europe to Africa and for slaves going 
from West Africa to the colonies. Large capital investments were required to 
provide and constantly improve the needed ships, port facilities, fortified bases, 
docks, storage warehouses, and a host of other facilities. As the Atlantic trade 
grew, many institutions were either invented, or greatly improved, as a result of 
the need to invest large amounts of capital under very risky conditions.  Joint 
stock companies, and marine insurance were two of the most important. Italy's 
financial institutions arose around the large trading monopolies and the 
institutions and financial instruments were designed to accommodate these large 
players. Northern markets tapped new pools of capital by also catering to less 
wealthy investors. The innovation spilled over to have productivity enhancing 
effects on many commercial activities not directly related to transoceanic trade.10 
                                                 
10 One of the most interesting spillovers “concerned magnetism and the compass…when Columbus crossed the 
Atlantic, his navigators found their compasses continually changing their angle with true north. From then on, 
compass variation became a serious navigational problem [which was eventually solved by time keeping, time 
zones and the invention of longitude]….[I]n 1600, William Gilbert published De Magnete and….with his 
daring hypothesis that the earth was a gigantic magnet, he turned magnetism from a body of empirical 
observations into a science. […] Since magnetism is closely related to electricity, Gilbert also took one of the 
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3. Complementarities with a cluster of technologies that typically include those that 
are socially, politically and economically transformative. The 3M ship enabled 
for the first time truly global trade, including North and South America, south and 
central Asia, as well as the pacific islands. Because of that ship, the central 
location of economic activity shifted to the Atlantic coast, while the 
Mediterranean region declined in relative terms. Overland trade within Europe, 
and between it and the East, became a less important and more costly alternative, 
sealing the fate of the Champagne fairs. More importantly the 3M ship enabled 
the institution of European colonialism of the Americas, Australia, many Pacific 
islands, parts of Africa and parts of Asia. These required many physical and 
institutional innovations that had social and political implications that persist to 
the present. 
 
4. There are no close possible substitutes. Until the development of the iron steam 
ship in the 19th century, there were no substitutes for the 3M ship in its trans-
oceanic uses. 
5. Have a wide array of applications. Although 3M ships did not have the same vast 
array of multiple uses as did electricity, they did have more than a single use, as 
transport for freight and passengers, as fighting machines, as communication 
vehicles (carrying messages overseas), and as vehicles for exploration and 
scientific discovery. More importantly, as globalised trade expanded to become 
the main source of (Smithian) economic growth in the 16th and 17th centuries, 
their use spread over many sectors of the economies that required sea transport for 
both inputs and outputs. 
6.  Initially crude and evolving in nature. This technology emerged from long history 
of ship development stretching back centuries. The 15th Portuguese caravel is 
often regarded as one of the immediate precursors of the emerging GPT of the 
three-masted sailing ship (although competing versions emerge in northern 
Europe and existed in South-East Asia at or near this time). The fundamental 
breakthroughs in rigging were to combine three known technologies: the square 
sail, the lateen sail and the triangular foresail, but on a long forespar. The 
fundamental breakthrough in hull design was a move from overlapping planks to 
butted planks sealed with caulking. These innovations incrementally improved the 
efficiency of sailing in rough seas and tacking against the wind and thus vastly 
extended the possible range and safety of voyages.  
The question of whether or not a technology has enough of the defining characteristics to 
classify it as a GPT can be answered, as in the above cases of electricity and the 3M ship, by an 
enumeration of observed characteristics. This usually requires extensive historical research, 
                                                 
first steps, and it was an enormous step, towards the invention of the dynamo and practical electrical power. 
[…] The development of the science of magnetism illustrates the often surprising complementarities between 
technologies–here the three-masted sailing ship on the one hand and magnetism and electricity on the other.” 
(Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar, 2005: 171-2) 
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research that uses both qualitative and quantitative data. The most direct evidence that a 
technology may not be a GPT is failure to identify it as having our six defining characteristics. 
Of course as discussed in detail in the immediately preceding section, there will always be 
borderline cases for which the enumerations under these 6 items leaves uncertainty as to whether 
or not to call a specific technology a GPT. But as argued there, this is an inevitable result when 
the items in any continuously varying series are divided into a few discrete classes in order to 
theorise about them.  
 
III. EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENTS AND TESTS 
Rather than make the historical analyses referred to for electricity and the 3M ship in the 
previous section, some writers have tried to determine whether or not a particular technology is a 
GPT through the study of quantitative empirical data. The two candidates for such data that are 
found in the literature are patent data and macroeconomic data (typically measures of 
productivity and/or GDP growth). We consider the use of macro data in Section IV. Here we 
consider the use of patent data. 
There are also two ways to interpret these studies: (i) as a test of a prediction assumed to 
be derived from GPT theory; or (ii) as a test of the existential statement that the technology in 
question is a GPT.  With regard to the first possibility, none of the existing formal theories of 
GPTs are designed to produce predictions about patents. While this does not preclude the use of 
patent data to establish specific things about GPTs, it does imply that those wishing to test 
predictions with such data should seek to derive testable implications from existing theories. 
However, no one seems to have accomplished this, or even tried to do it. The closest anyone gets 
to doing this is Moser and Nicholas (2004) in the paper discussed in more detail below when 
they state: “Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995 p. 3) argue that the range of later generations of 
inventions that benefit from an early patent can be measured as the range of industries that cite 
the early patent”. However, the only reference to patents in Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) 
concerns using them to estimate variables in their reaction functions, not as predictions of their 
theory So Moser and Nicholas’s, and other similar studies, study must be understood as testing 
an existential statement that electricity is a GPT rather than testing any specific predictions of the 
GPT theory. To consider this latter possibility we need first to ask how such existential 
statements can be tested.  
Testing a general existence statement. 
The existence statement that technology X is a GPT is neither a theory nor a prediction 
that is derived from a theory. It is instead a statement that technology X meets the requirements 
for being a GPT. The writers we are about to consider hold that such statements can be disproved 
for particular technologies using empirical data. But can such statements be proved or disproved? 
This question raises a more general methodological issue. Finding an example of X demonstrates 
the general statement that it exists, but not finding X does not prove it does not exist. In the latter 
case, one might not have looked hard enough, or in the right places, or any one of a multitude of 
other reasons. To take Karl Popper’s famous example, the statement “Angels exist” can be 
proven by finding what we all agree to be an angel, but cannot be falsified by failing to find an 
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angel. So we can prove a general existence statement; we can fail to prove it with some specific 
exercise or measurement; but we cannot disprove it.  
We can prove that technology X is a GPT by showing that it has all of our six defining 
characteristics. If our historical studies fail to find convincing evidence that it has the necessary 
defining characteristics, we would have failed to prove that it was a GPT; but we would not have 
proved that it was not a GPT−further research might, for example reveal characteristics that we 
missed earlier.  
Testing a qualified existence statement 
For an existence statement to be capable of being disproved by evidence it must be 
closely confined by enough conditions as to make it refutable. To rephrase Popper, the statement 
“an angel exists in visible form and is in this room” can be falsified by not finding it in this 
room. One case in point has already been mentioned. Field (2011, p. 218) criticized the concept 
of a GPT for being unable to rule out such trivial technologies as felt-pens or screws, which are 
widely used and for various purposes. Although the statement that felt-pens or screws are a GPT 
is an existence statement, it can be refuted because the universe of their use is sufficiently 
circumscribed. We can enumerate all of their uses and show that these have sufficiently close 
technological substitutes to disqualify them as being GPTs. 
 
Inappropriate tests of non-existence 
As was  argued above, to test the existential statement that a specified technology is not a 
GPT the statement must be sufficiently bounded in time and space so that the indicators of their 
existence can be exhaustively shown to be non-existent. But the technological characteristics 
associated with GPTs and their antecedents—technological complementarities and their 
evolution through time, number of uses, lack of technical substitutes, generality, etc.—do not 
map well or clearly onto the legal concepts underlying patent law. We note furthermore that 
other authors have been even more critical of the general value of patent data in economic 
studies.11  
As a case in point, we consider the study by Moser and Nicholas (2004) who analyze 
patent data in an attempt to determine whether or not electricity—which they argue is held to be 
among the list of quintessential GPTs—actually meets the criteria for being a GPT. Specifically, 
they use patent citations in an attempt to determine electricity’s generality, and how important it 
                                                 
11 Von Hipple (1988) notes that it is often better for agents concerned with maximizing the value of rents from 
innovation to forgo a patent. He notes further that this strategy is often pursued in cases of rapid innovation for 
technologies with many potential uses. Derochers (1998, p. 72) notes that “Austrian economists have long been 
hostile to the use of economic statistics…but their epistemological claims have not been echoed in the 
mainstream of the profession which, for a number of reasons, has always been fond of patent statistics. The 
purpose of this article was therefore to demonstrate that, even on strictly empirical grounds, the drawbacks 
associated with patent statistics are nothing short of major and that even in the best circumstances, these data 
only give us a partial picture of the technological potential of a small number of innovations. Doing empirical 
studies of innovation is a worthy goal, but this does not justify the use of bad indicators on the grounds that they 
are the only ones that fit well with the dominant methodologies.” 
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was in downstream innovations. They argue that while electricity was an extremely novel 
innovation (patents on related innovations rarely cited earlier patents), electricity was no more 
general than a number of other innovations because their data show relatively few 
complementary innovations, “Our results contradict the hypothesis that electricity was a GPT 
according to conventional definitions such as those of Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) or 
Lipsey, Bekar and Carlaw (1998). We find that ...electricity patents had lower generality scores, 
as measured by the distribution of their forward citations, fewer citations per patent (a measure 
of technological importance), and shorter citation lags (i.e., faster rates of knowledge 
depreciation)” (Moser and Nicholas 2004 388-89). 
There are many reasons why their arguments do not sustain their strong conclusions. 
1. Their measure of generality is a Herfindahl-Hirschman index that measures the range, or 
extent, of a patent’s generality. They argue that the index shows that electricity was not 
general in its application in the period 1976 - 2002. What the index actually shows is that 
those few patents that they observe in the USPTO industrial classification of electricity 
are no more general than the patents they observe in other classifications such as 
chemicals. Yet if one looks at the industrial and household activities of any developed 
economy in the period 1976-2002 one would be hard pressed to identify many activities 
that did not employ electricity somewhere in their production technologies. 
2. They argue that patents for chemical technologies were found to be more ‘general’ than 
electrical technologies. However, in many cases, the chemical innovation that were cited 
relied on electricity as a cooperating or enabling technology but that relationship was a 
technological and not a legal one. They write (392) “The most striking fact about our list 
of the most general inventions is the relative paucity of electricity patents. Even Fuller’s 
invention of an electric contact is distinguished by the chemical discovery that silver-
copper alloys are less sensitive to damage caused by heat and arcing.” But of course the 
electric contact is part of the cluster of electricity related technologies making up the 
GPT. That it was a chemical based innovation is immaterial. Similarly many of the other 
patents for innovations that were wholly reliant on electricity either did not cite earlier 
patents, or the earlier electrical innovations were themselves not patented. 
3. Most of the vast range of products that were enabled by electricity from the array of 
household machines to radio, TV, electronic computers, the Internet, electronic 
microscopes, and GPS when they were patented did not typically mention electricity as a 
necessary condition for their existence. Also as any GPT becomes increasingly 
ubiquitous, as is electricity today, it tends to be cited relatively less than newer and more 
novel technologies with a more limited range of applications. 
4. Electricity’s technological complementarities cover a much bigger set of electricity-
dependent innovations than can be captured by forward patent citations. To illustrate, 
consider our case study of electricity examined earlier. The redesign of modern factories 
around the central drive shaft with unit drive motors was technologically and 
economically transformative but many of its elements were not patented.  
5. Their measure of originality covers only a small part of electricity’s chronology (1920 to 
1976) and range of effects (four industrial categories are surveyed: electricity, chemicals, 
mechanical, other). They exclude some major applications of electricity, computers and 
communications, due to lack of data.  
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We conclude that although their work provides some interesting and informative data, it 
cannot sustain their strong conclusions. The absence of relevant patent data cannot refute the 
proposition that any one technology is a GPT.  Furthermore, the range of their study covers far 
less in time and space than the universe over which electricity was (and continues to be) a major 
enabler of inventions and innovations. Thus, it does not come near to the exhaustive study that 
would be needed to refute the existential statement that electricity is a GPT.12 
So, while patent data may be useful for many purposes including estimating the 
parameters associated with a particular GPT, they cannot be used to establish a technology is not 
a GPT. 
Patent data corroboration 
Patents have been used in the literature to establish many things about technologies, 
which can include providing a minimum estimate of the existence of some of the defining 
characteristics of a GPT, such as the downstream technologies that it has enabled. However, for 
reasons already discussed these must be understood to be minimum estimates not exhaustive 
listings. 
Here are some examples of the productive use of patent data on technologies. In a study 
that predates the introduction of the GPT concept, Trajtenberg, Henderson and Jaffe (1992) use  
 
…patent citations to measure the "basicness" and appropriability of inventions. We 
propose that [1] the basicness of research underlying an invention can be characterized by 
the nature of the previous patents cited by an invention; [2] that the basicness of research 
outcomes relates to the subsequent patents that cite an invention; and [3] that the fraction 
of citing patents that are assigned to the same organization as the original invention is a 
measure of appropriability. 
 
Other studies, for example, Feldman and Yoon (2011), and Stuart and Iacopetta (2014), 
use patent data in an attempt to establish that the technologies of rDNA and nanotechnology are 
GPTs. Both of these studies try to measure characteristics of GPT, in particular they construct 
hypotheses that use patent data to measure the pervasiveness and the complementarities of the 
technologies they consider. They present examples of empirical studies that find evidence 
                                                 
12 One might ask; if not patent data, then what data would provide a test that a specific technology was a GPT? 
Our answer is: the data concerning our six characteristics. And we have demonstrated how one might do this 
using qualitative data in our examples of electricity and three-masted sailing ships. However, if the desire is to 
find quantitative data to perform such an empirical investigation, then such data has yet to be collected, as far as 
we know. If such qualitative and/or quantitative data cannot be found for all six, then the proposition that the 
technology in questions a GPT becomes dubious. But all that can be concluded is that the technology is 
question cannot currently be shown to be GPT, while for many technologies the possibility of finding new data 
that changes this conclusion cannot be ruled out definitively. (Of course, there will always be borderline cases 
of technologies that have some but not of all of our six characteristics, or that only do so in a small way for at 




showing that certain technologies have some of the characteristics of GPTs. But what they could 
not do (nor do they try to do) is to prove that these technologies were not GPTs.  
IV. THEORETICAL MODELLING OF GPTS     
Cantner and Vannuccini (2012) provide an excellent summary of the development of 
GPT theories from Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) to Carlaw and Lipsey (2011). So here we 
only mention a few salient features relevant to our present purposes.  
When looking at such theories we may ask what we would like to see in them. Among 
other things, a desirable list of features includes: 
(1) assumptions that, as far as possible, capture the empirically observed characteristics of 
GPTs; 
(2) although abstraction is necessary in any theory, ceteris paribus, the more relevant 
characteristics of the phenomena that are modelled in the assumptions the better; 
(3)  the minimum of counter-factual assumptions and those that are used are robust in the 
technical sense that they can be removed without altering any of the theory’s critical conclusions; 
(4) in particular, the absence of ad hoc, counterfactual assumptions that are employed merely 
to produce some desired result (e.g., one of the theory’s key predictions); 
(5) the minimum of predictions (preferably none) that are clearly refuted by existing 
empirical evidence. 
One of the main contributions of Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) was to break the link 
between changes in technology and productivity that is inherent in models that use aggregate 
production functions and measure productivity as a residual (i.e., TFP). The way was then 
opened for theories that could explain the productivity paradox of changes in technology that 
were not systematically related to changes in productivity.  
First-generation models  
The first post-Bresnahan-and-Trajtenberg-generation theorists sought to explain an 
apparent association between the introduction of major new technologies and slowdowns and 
surges in GDP and/or productivity growth. All of their theories have assumptions not found in 
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) or in the literature on transforming technologies. Some of 
these assumptions merely simplify the authors’ analysis. However, some others that are clearly 
counterfactual drive the model’s results. This violates the important methodological rule that 
assumptions that are patently counterfactual should be robust in the sense defined above. The 
most important assumptions follow (with our comments in Italic). 
1. GPTs arrive exogenously and there exists only one GPT in use at any one time 
so that the behaviour of the macro economy closely mirrors the behaviour of 
the GPT. This implicitly uses the one-at-a-time definition of a GPT that we 
discussed in Section I and which we gave reasons for not using in our study.  
For one reason, there are usually several GPTs in active use at any one time. 
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2. All agents are able to identify a new technology as a GPT when it first arrives 
and to predict its value over its entire lifetime. This is necessary in order to 
apply conventional maximising theory to the models. In contrast, actual 
experience shows that it is not always clear if a new technology will develop 
into a GPT when it is first innovated and this uncertainty often extends over a 
long time span. Also, it is clearly impossible to predict the full future course of 
any GPT once it has been identified as such. 
3. It follows from assumption 2 that in these theories there can be no uncertainty 
in decisions regarding those GPTs. In contrast, empirical evidence shows that 
uncertainties (in Knight’s (1921) sense) are ubiquitous in the development of 
almost all new technologies. 
4. There is a single vertical complementarity between the GPT and its 
components and all of these components are horizontal substitutes for each 
other. In fact downstream technologies often complement the development of 
the original GPT, and each other, as did the assembly line, just-in-time 
inventories and robot-operated assembly lines, while others are more or less 
independent of each other as were the vacuum cleaner and the electric 
washing machine—all of which depend on electricity. 
All of these first-generation models that address the issue predict a slowdown followed 
by a surge in a least one of the macro variables following on the arrival of a new GPT, 
immediately in Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998a) and with a lag in Helpman and Trajtenberg 
(1998b) and in Aghion and Howitt (1998). As we have noted, however, the original model in 
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, (1995) was designed to produce such slowdowns. Although the 
heuristic value of these models is not at issue here, it is clear that these models fall short of 
capturing our six defining characteristics. However, such limitations are typical of the early 
stages of any research program for the development of some important new theory so that 
pointing them out “…should be understood as markers for further research rather than arguments 
for ignoring these first pioneering attempts at modelling the impact of GPTs” (Lipsey, Carlaw 
and Bekar, 2005: 384). 
Later-Generation Models 
In the first of the second-generation models, van Zon, Fortune and Kronenberg (2003) make 
two important improvements. First, they allow more than one GPT to exist at any one time and, 
second, they allow a potential GPT to fail if enough supporting components are not developed 
for it. While this model is a significant improvement over all previous models, it could be 
improved yet further by altering some of its assumptions that are not consistent with what we 
know about GPTs. 
 First, in their model all GPTs cooperate with each other in jointly producing the composite 
final good; they never compete with each other as electricity did with steam and steam with 
water wheels. Second, and counterfactually, each GPT has a smaller impact on output and 
growth than does each previous GPT. Third, in the long run GPTs do not sustain growth, which 
goes asymptotically to zero. 
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Most of the other second-generation models are concerned with the transitional dynamics 
that follow the exogenous introduction of a new GPT. Pestas (2003) alone makes the 
unequivocal prediction that the pattern of a slowdown and a surge in the transition to a new 
steady state will follow the introduction of all new GPTs. Both Harada (2009) and Rainer and 
Strohmaier (2014) make the pattern of a slowdown and/or surge conditional on the exogenously 
determined relative attractiveness of R&D devoted to GPTs and ancillary technologies. 
All of the above models are technically complex in ways that make it extremely difficult 
to alter their assumptions to increase their empirical relevance. They all use dynamically 
stationary equilibrium concepts with agents that maximize over the whole life of the GPTs that 
are developed under conditions of either certainty or risk. This maximising condition requires the 
counterfactual assumption that agents can foresee the actual or probable consequences of a 
newly introduced GPT over a lifetime that often covers centuries and clearly involves many 
genuine uncertainties 
Non-stationary models  
The theories in Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005, Chapters 13-15) and in Carlaw and 
Lipsey (2006: 2011) differ in that they are not constructed to produce any set of macro effects; 
rather, they are constructed to capture many of the micro characteristics of GPTs, and then see 
what these imply with respect to growth slowdowns, surges and other aspects of GPT-induced 
behaviour. 
As an example consider the model in Carlaw and Lipsey (2011). It has three sectors: a 
pure research sector that develops and produces GPTs, an applied research sector that develops 
applications of these GPTs that are suitable for use in production, and a goods-producing sector 
that uses the technologies developed by the applied research sector. The model’s many 
assumptions concerning GPTs are all based on known facts related to technologies and 
technological change. Some of these are common to most technologies, some just to most major 
technologies, and a few are unique to GPTs. They are summarised in Table 1. To compare this 
model with those discussed in the previous section, the columns of the table show those 
assumptions that are found in all other GPT models, in some but not all other models, and in 





Table 1: Characteristics of GPTs in Carlaw and Lipsey (2011) compared with those 
in previous models 












GPT is developed through endogenous R&D  X  
GPT efficiency increases over time X   
GPT diffuses slowly through the economy   X 
Several distinct GPTs exist simultaneously  X  
GPTs are grouped by class   X 
GPTs may overlap within and between classes   X 
Technologies in different classes may be complements   X 
Uncertainty regarding the knowledge to be produced by a 
given amount of R&D 
 X  
Uncertainty regarding timing of new GPTs  X  
Uncertainty regarding new GPT’s productivity   X 
Uncertainty regarding GPTs relationship to existing GPTs   X 
Uncertainty regarding if and when an incumbent  GPT will 
be replaced by a new GPT within its class 
  X 
Agents unable to maximize over life of GPT   X 
No unique evolutionary path for each GPT because of 
random components on the outcomes of decisions  
  X 
 
To incorporate all of these assumptions, the model cannot employ a stationary dynamic 
equilibrium concept. Instead, an unorthodox model is required ─ one that evolves in ways that 
are not wholly mechanistic and hence not wholly predictable. There is a transitional equilibrium 
in every time period, given the current expected marginal productivities of inputs in each sector. 
But because of technological advance and the fact that agents cannot foresee the consequence of 
the complementarities arising from their present resource allocation decisions, the marginal 
products of resources change in each line of activity from one period to the next. Thus the 
equilibrium outcome is different in each period and the economy never settles into a stationary 
equilibrium (neither a steady state nor a balanced growth path). This focuses the model on the 
historical, path-dependent process of knowledge accumulation and uneven patterns of growth 
driven by variable rates of innovation.  
Fortunately, these alterations make the model technically much simpler than the earlier 
models of GPT-driven, stationary equilibrium growth. As a result, the model can be extended to 
include an increasing number of empirically relevant characteristics in its assumptions. 





A large number of simulation runs of the Carlaw and Lipsey (2011) model produce some 
interesting behaviours that can be regarded as the model’s predictions.  
1. There is no consistent correlation between the arrival of any one GPT and the 
slowdown or acceleration of either GDP or productivity.  These may occur with 
the introduction of a new GPT, but only in some circumstances. First, the arrival 
of more than one new GPT at more or less the same time can combine to exert a 
measurable effect on GDP. Second, more than one GPT can be coevolving 
through similar stages of development at roughly the same time and so reinforce 
each other in their effects on the economy. Third, one GPT may be much more 
‘powerful’ than the typical one and so have a noticeable effect on the economy 
by itself (as was probably the case with electricity).  But more often than not, the 
effects of GPTs at various stages in their evolution cancel each other out in the 
macro data. This agrees with many researchers have found empirically and what 
was argued in Lipsey Bekar and Carlaw (1998: 207).  
2. In the model’s many simulations, changes in measured TFP do not correlate with 
changes in technology. This is interesting because of the long-standing debate as 
to whether or not TFP is a valid measure of technological change (as it is in 
Solow-type growth models).13 This also conforms to what we observe, as for 
example when, in the late 1980s, there were large changes in ICTs but little 
changes in the measured growth rates of either productivity or GDP. 
3. The model produces the result that GPTs rejuvenate and sustain the growth 
process by creating an array of opportunities to develop new innovations 
applicable in the production of final goods. If no further GPTs are allowed to 
arrive, existing GPTs continue to improve in efficiency and the applied R&D 
sector continues to innovate. But both of these activities eventually encounter 
diminishing returns, causing the growth process to slow and eventually to stop. If 
new GPTs are again allowed to arrive, the endogenous growth process is 
rejuvenated and growth is sustained into the indefinite future. 
4. The model’s GDP-driven growth is sustained without any activity exhibiting 
increasing returns to the accumulating factors as is required in some endogenous 
growth models in the tradition of Romer (1986, 1990) and Lucas (1988)–returns 
that researchers seeking to measure R&D spillovers, were unable to agree that 
they had detected in the macro data that were studied after these theories were 
presented.  
Another important historical observation is that GPTs transform the structures of the 
economy and society. Although this result cannot yet be derived from a formal model, there is 
ample historical evidence supporting it. Writing allowed the first development of complex 
societies and cities in Mesopotamia. Bronze allowed the development of organised warfare, the 
development of multi-city empires, and the transfer of political authority from temple to crown. 
Movable-type printing contributed to a knowledge society unimaginable when all manuscripts 
had to be laboriously copied by hand. The steam engine, combined with automated textile 
machinery, led to the urbanisation first of England and then of many continental countries as 
                                                 
13 See Carlaw and Lipsey (2002) and Lipsey and Carlaw (2004) and for discussions of this point. 
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factories moved from dispersed sites with fast running water to the new vast Victorian industrial 
cities. As well as permitting countless new products and processes, the computer and related 
technologies, such as the cell phone and social media, has transformed the economic, social and 
political structures in profound ways. And so on through every major GPT and its set of 
derivative technologies.  
A way ahead 
One characteristic that is important but not included in any of the models mentioned so 
far is that a technology may emerge in a narrow use and, through interaction with other 
technologies and research processes, evolve into a full GPT, as for example did the steam engine, 
the electronic computer and the internet. The beginnings of an approach to modelling this 
characteristic are found in van Zon, Fortune and Kronenberg (2003), Cantner and Vannuccini 
(2012 and 2016), and Korzinovy and Savin (2016). 
A key to modelling this characteristic is that GPTs should not be ex ante identifiable. In 
all of the above-mentioned models (and in Carlaw and Lipsey (2011)) a candidate technology 
may fail to become a GPT.14 To allow for this possibility, the four theories model GPTs as an 
endogenous emergent property of an evolutionary interaction between a sector that produces 
knowledge for the creation of GPTs and an applied sector that produces complementary 
technologies useful in the goods-producing sector. In this modelling, some part of the knowledge 
succeeds in creating actual GPTs while other parts fail to do so.  
Along with the possibility of modeling the interaction of a new GPT with the economy’s 
existing structure, which may need substantial alteration to accommodate the new GPT (as it did 
with steam engines and the computer), this incorporation of the GPT as an emerging property, 
and the feedback from the applied sector to the pure research sector, are all on the table for 
further important theoretical developments.   
Slowdowns and Surges 
One serious problem that contributed to the origins of GPT theory was concern over the 
‘productivity paradox’ of the 1980s. Paul David’s 1990 article provided detailed evidence as to 
why the introduction of electricity caused lagged responses—both slowdowns and 
accelerations—in the growth of productivity. This issue was then taken up by the post Bresnahan 
and Trajtenberg (1995) first-generation GPT theories. These were constructed to generate 
aggregate slowdowns followed by surges after the introduction of a new GPT. David’s work on 
electricity in combination with these theoretical models have been so influential that many 
subsequent authors of empirical studies have assumed that all GPT theories predicted slowdowns 
and/or surges. For example, after following Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005) in dismissing 
slowdowns as a necessary characteristic of all GPTs, Ristuccia and Solomou (2014: 229) assert 
                                                 
14 Cantner and Vannuccini (2012) argue that Carlaw and Lipsey (2011) revert to a stochastic GPT arrival process 
that makes the GPT ex ante identifiable. But, in fact, while the knowledge for potential GPTs does stochastically 
arrive in the Carlaw and Lipsey (2011) model, that potential GPT may not become an actual GPT if it fails an 
expected efficiency criteria test and thus is not eventually adopted any of the model’s applied sectors.    
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that: “The only thing that seems common to all GPT models …is that the introduction of a new 
GPT should eventually determine a productivity surge”.  
As already observed, this and other similar empirical work can be seen either as testing 
an assumed prediction of all GPT theories or as testing whether or not a particular technology 
was a GPT by assuming that this macro behaviour was part of the definition of GPTs. We have 
already examined in the case of electricity why the existence statement that a particular 
technology was GPT cannot be refuted by empirical data so we concentrate here on the 
interpretation that the empirical work is testing an assumed macro prediction of GPT theory. 
There are at least three serious problems with equating the arrival of GPTs with growth 
slowdowns and surges. First, different first generation theories predict different types of 
slowdowns. For example, Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998a) predict cycles of slowdowns and 
bonuses in both TFP and GDP, while Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998b) and Aghion and Howitt 
(1998) predict this pattern for real wages and real output. 
Second, as already argued, later theories that were not designed to produce slowdowns 
and surges of any sort do not predict their inevitability. Indeed, after an analysis of this issue, 
Carlaw and Lipsey (2002: 1314-15) conclude: “…there needs to be no observable impact of new 
technologies on rates of return…”.  Also Lipsey, Bekar and Carlaw (1998: 207) argue “The main 
problem with any hypothesis concerning transitional effects is to establish a link between the 
evolutionary paths of individual GPTs and the observed macro behaviour of the economy….It is 
quite possible for all individual technologies in the economy to follow a logistic pattern of 
productivity growth, while macro growth follows random variations around a more or less stable 
trend.” After the long analysis that follows this statement, they conclude (212): “We argue only 
that GPTs do not always cause slowdowns. Further, when a GPT is the source of an observable 
macro slowdown, we would expect to find certain characteristic patterns within the development 
trajectory of the GPT itself, and interactions with other technologies, and the existing facilitating 
structure and policy institutions”. This is also what the Carlaw and Lipsey (2011) model predicts: 
slowdowns and surges associated with the introduction of a new GPT under some identifiable 
conditions but not others. 
Third, empirical evidence shows that some GPTs have been associated with various types 
of slowdowns while others have not—an ambiguous result that is again predicted by the Carlaw 
and Lipsey (2011) model. For example, railways, the iron steamship, the laser, and 
biotechnology were not clearly associated with slowdowns followed by surges. In contrast, 
Jovanovich and Rouseau (2005) argue that electricity and Information Technology did exhibit 
this pattern, although the period they chose for electricity, 1894-1930, is clearly arbitrary and 
omits later times when electricity was being used for many new products and processes. In 
contrast, electricity is argued not to have a productivity bonus by Ristuccia and Solomou (2014). 
Castellacci (2010) finds that industries taken to be more closely related to ICT production and 
use experienced a productivity bonus with the introduction of this GPT. Those industries 
associated with the old (Fordist mass production) GPT or further away from the production and 
use of the new GPT experienced productivity slowdowns. This is interesting although it is not 
quite the slowdowns followed by bonuses predicted for the macro economy by the first-
generation theories. Finally, Rainer and Strohmaier (2014: 427) using Danish industrial level 
data spanning the years 1966 to 2007 find that ICTs had what they call the empirical 
26 
 
characteristics of a GPT in that among other things “...persistent improvements in the technology 
have led to economy-wide productivity gains”. 
Our criticism of the use of productivity data here is its use both to test GPT theory in 
general and whether a particular technology is a GPT. For example, Ristuccia and Solomou 
(2014: 227) argue that their finding of only modest productivity gains associated with electricity 
“challenges the usefulness of general purpose technology (GPT) theory as a way of 
conceptualizing the relationship between technological advances and long-term economic 
growth.” They conclude (244) by arguing that GPT theory either: (i) theorizes about a class of 
technologies that do not exist; and/or, (ii) is a set of truisms about the impact of big innovations 
on growth in GDP and productivity trends that have been long known and understood. The many 
points made in the above text provide our rebuttal to these contentions. 
Nothing said here is an argument against determining whether or not the introduction of a 
particular technology, seen to be a GPT by its conformity with our six defining characteristics, 
was followed by the macro pattern of a slowdown and/or a surge—or indeed by such a pattern in 
one sector of the economy. The circumstances in which this will and will not happen are of 
interest.  
Rejuvenation of Growth Potential Without the Necessity of Slowdowns or 
Surges15 
Regarding our list of predictions above, 1, 2 and 4 agree closely with the evidence, but 
one might wonder how 1 and 3 can both be correct. How can a single new GPT rejuvenate the 
growth process without sooner or later causing a productivity surge?  
Consider the stylised example illustrated in Figure 1. This is not meant to be a realistic 
representation of the whole growth process but is used only to illustrate the difference between 
rejuvenating growth and producing a productivity bonus. The figure relates the capital stock (K) 
to the marginal productivity of capital (MPK).  Each curve, MP1, MP2 and MP3, refers to a given 
state of technology. As the Classical economists long ago observed, since each curve is assumed 
to be negatively sloped by virtue of the law of diminishing returns, capital accumulation with no 
technical change will cause the marginal product to fall and eventually approach zero (the onset 
of the stationary state). In contrast, technological change without capital accumulation raises the 
marginal product of capital along a vertical line, such as the dashed line starting at k1. The 
combination of technological change and capital accumulation—and they do typically go 
together—moves the economy along some non-vertical trajectory. If capital accumulation is 
slow relative to technological change, the trajectory of productivity rises along the path such as 
P1; if it is high relative to technological change, the path will be a falling one such as in P3; while 
if it is just the right combination of technical change and capital accumulation, the path is the 
horizontal one, P2. So all that we can say in general about the effect of major new GPTs is that 
they rejuvenate the growth process by making productivity higher than it would have been if 
there had been the same amount of capital accumulation but little or no technological change. 
Nothing can be said about how the growth rates of productivity and GDP will change when a 
                                                 
15 This section relies heavily on Carlaw and Lipsey (2002) 
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new GPT and its derivative technologies first begin to diffuse throughout the economy, shifting 
the MPK curve to the right while the capital stock increases.  
Care must be taken in using this analysis further as it is fully aggregated while the effects 
of an individual technology, GPT or otherwise, depends on complex interactions with the other 











  V. CONCLUSION 
The class of technologies that we call GPTs is important because GPTs spawn a host of 
new technologies and improve the efficiency of existing ones. They do this both by lowering the 
cost of broadly defined products or services, such as power or transportation, and by making 
possible a range of new products and processes many of which were technically impossible 
without it. This is one sense in which they rejuvenate the growth process. They may or may not 
cause a surge in the growth of productivity or GDP. But they do make future productivity and 
GDP higher than they would have been in their absence and so avoid the onset of the Classical 
stationary state caused by diminishing returns to capital. (They also have other more general 
transformative effects but these are less important, a least for existing growth theory.) 
GPTs are not the only cause of such effects. Other important technologies or groups of 
technologies can have similar effects. This is not a problem for GPT theory. It only holds that 
there is an identifiable group of technologies that share common characteristics but not that these 
characteristics are each unique to GPTs.  
Along with most economic historians, some economists, such as Nathan Rosenberg, 
Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter, have argued that a nation’s technology is a complex, 
hierarchical and constantly evolving system. Yet the majority of models of economic growth 
continue to contain only one sector described by an aggregate production function and a scalar 
0 K k1 






value of technology, the latter determined either endogenously or exogenously. Following in the 
footsteps of Joseph Schumpeter, Nelson and Winter (1982) began the modern study of the 
economy as an evolving system while Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) began the modeling of 
technology as having more characteristics than can be captured by a single number. This paper 
has followed in this tradition, arguing for the usefulness of GPTs as the central organizing 
framework for analyzing technological change and long-run economic growth. We adopt this 
concept over other possible frameworks, including Mokyr’s macro inventions (Mokyr 1990) and 
Freeman and Perez’s techno-economic paradigm (Freeman and Perez 1988). Briefly the techno-
economic paradigm, although useful in historical studies (see e.g., Freeman and Louҫa 2001), 
includes far too much to be useful as a foundation for analytical models of technology-driven 
growth. Also Mokyr’s class of macro inventions is too broad for our purposes, including as it 
does such things as spectacles, the weight-driven mechanical clock, the casting of iron, coke as a 
power source, the hot air balloon, the bicycle, and the screw propeller. 
The concept of GPTs may or may not be useful to economic historians. However, if 
economists wish to continue with the research program of more sophisticated modeling of 
technology and technical change while also following the advice of some critics by abandoning 
the concept of GPTs, the obvious question is: What better theoretical concept of structured 
technology, capable of being used in formal models, would be put in its place and how different 
would it look? We know of none on the horizon. So we advocate proceeding on several fronts: 
learning from criticisms of GPT theory whether intended by their authors as constructive or 
destructive, making GPTs and related concepts more precise, modeling more of their known 
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